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2 June 1991

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 26 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

1. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted on 3 April 1991 resolution 687 (1991), paragraph 1 of which affirmed all 13 resolutions (660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, except as expressly changed by resolution 687 (1991). By paragraph 26 of resolution 687 (1991) the Security Council requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within 60 days, for its approval, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of resolution 687 (1991), and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating those guidelines periodically.

2. Paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of resolution 687 (1991) read as follows:

> "The Security Council,
>
> "...
>
> "24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:
>
> "(a) Arms and related matériel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;

"(b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;

"(c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

"(d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

"25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements;

"...

"27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance".

3. Implementation of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) is to be effected in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions. Resolution 661 (1990) established a comprehensive set of sanctions to be implemented by all States against Iraq and occupied Kuwait, including the sale or supply of weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories, and any activities that promoted or were calculated to promote such sale or supply of such items. Under paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990), the Security Council established a committee consisting of all the members of the Council to undertake the tasks set out in that paragraph. By resolution 665 (1990), the Council called upon those Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait and deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as might be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990). By resolution 670 (1990) the Council confirmed that resolution 661 (1990) applied to all means of transport, including aircraft. With the specific purpose of preventing the carriage of any commodities or products prohibited under resolution 661 (1990) to or from Iraq or occupied Kuwait, resolution 670 (1990) established mandatory provisions concerning flights. Under those provisions the Council required all States, inter alia, to deny any aircraft permission to take off from or overfly their territory if such aircraft was destined to land in Iraq or occupied Kuwait, unless certain conditions were

met, as specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution. The Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait was vested with specific responsibilities, including notification or approval procedures for such flights.

4. On the basis of the above observations, the Secretary-General undertook consultations with appropriate Governments, in accordance with paragraph 26 of resolution 687 (1991). The input from those consultations has been taken into particular account by the Secretary-General in the preparation of the draft guidelines called for by paragraph 26 of that resolution. The draft guidelines are herewith transmitted for the consideration of the Security Council (see annex).

Annex

Draft guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present guidelines have been developed in accordance with paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of that resolution.

I. CATEGORIES OF PROHIBITED ITEMS AND ACTIVITIES

2. For the purpose of the present guidelines, the items and activities proscribed are those referred to in paragraph 24, in conjunction with paragraphs 8 and 12, of resolution 687 (1991) and are the following:

(a) Arms and related matériel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of:

(i) All forms of conventional weapons and military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;

(ii) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks or agents and all related subsystems and components;

(iii) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts;

(iv) Nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components;

(b) All research, development, support and manufacturing facilities for the items as specified and defined in paragraphs 8 (a) and 12 of resolution 687 (1991);

(c) Repair and production facilities for all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts;

(d) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items as specified in paragraphs 24 (a), 8 and 12 of resolution 687 (1991);

(e) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items as specified in paragraphs 24 (a), 8 and 12 of resolution 687 (1991).

II. UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR MONITORING THE ARMS AND RELATED SANCTIONS

3. The Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait (hereinafter referred to as "the Committee") will be the organ of the Security Council responsible for monitoring the prohibitions against the sale or supply of arms to Iraq and related sanctions established in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) (hereinafter referred to as "arms and related sanctions"). The Committee will carry out its functions in accordance with the mandate provided in resolutions 661 (1990), 665 (1990) and 670 (1990) in so far as it relates to the items proscribed under paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991).

4. The Committee will closely cooperate and coordinate its activities with any present and future bodies that will, pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), be responsible for the monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the obligations set forth in paragraphs 10 and 12 of that resolution, in so far as they concern the acquisition of the items referred to in those paragraphs. The bodies referred to above will therefore have access to the Committee and will draw its attention to any problems that they may encounter in pursuing their mandate.

5. In discharging its tasks as regards the items referred to in paragraphs 8 (a) and 12 of resolution 687 (1991), the Committee will work in close cooperation with the Special Commission established under paragraph 9 of the resolution and with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In carrying out its work, the Committee will also be able to make use of any expertise or information relevant to its functions available elsewhere within the United Nations system.

6. For the purposes of the present guidelines, the functions of the Committee will be the following:

(a) To meet at regular intervals to examine reports submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the relevant resolutions;

(b) To provide guidance to States and to international organizations, either upon their request or at its own initiative, on matters concerning the implementation of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), inter alia, through the elaboration, as necessary, of relevant criteria;

(c) To reach, in connection with subparagraph (b) above, when needed, agreed interpretations of items falling within the specified categories of proscribed items and activities;

(d) To seek information and maintain contact with States, international organizations and those non-governmental organizations whose activities and/or expertise are likely to promote strict implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq;

(e) To bring to the attention of the States and international organizations concerned information reported to it of alleged violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq for appropriate action by those States and international organizations;

(f) To report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions.

III. PRINCIPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION

7. The actual implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq will be effected at three levels: by all States, by international organizations and through intergovernmental cooperation. States and international organizations are called upon to act strictly in accordance with the arms and related sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements.

A. States

8. All States should report to the Secretary-General within 45 days of the approval by the Security Council of the present guidelines on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991).

9. All States should ensure the institution or maintenance of national controls, procedures and other measures consistent with the present guidelines as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991). On that basis, States should ensure that these measures:

(a) Prevent any circumvention of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, including but not limited to direct circumvention, indirect or clandestine circumvention, and circumvention through subcontracts to companies within the State itself or in other States;

(b) Prohibit the export to Iraq of those dual-purpose or multi-purpose items that States may have reason to believe will be used for military purposes;

(c) Ensure against the provision of any technology, research, personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the production, utilization, stockpiling, design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support for any of the items as described in paragraph 2 of the present guidelines;

(d) Require that the sale, licensing or other contracts with States or foreign companies contain end-user transfer assurances that ensure no

transfer, retransfer, transshipment or servicing to Iraq or to individuals or bodies inside Iraq or to individuals or bodies outside Iraq acting for the benefit of Iraq or of individuals or bodies inside Iraq of any of the items described in paragraph 2 of the present guidelines;

(e) Require from exporters and other commercial intermediaries a declaration that the items for export described in paragraph 2 of the present guidelines are not destined for Iraq directly or through third-party arrangements;

(f) Provide for legal powers to inspect documents and goods and to detain and seize goods where appropriate;

(g) Impose appropriate penalties for non-compliance in their territories and by their nationals elsewhere, and to notify the Committee of all incidents of such non-compliance.

10. Nothing in the present guidelines will preclude any State or group of States from adopting further measures aimed at achieving effective implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991).

11. States should ensure that the provisions of the national measures instituted by them are adequately publicized and disseminated within their territories and among their nationals elsewhere, particularly to arms technology developers, producers, traders and exporters and to the transport sector. In implementing the present guidelines, States should pay particular attention to companies known to have been involved in illegal arms procurement activities on behalf of Iraq.

12. States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. In this regard, States are reminded of their duties under paragraph 7 of resolution 661 (1990) to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfilment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee.

13. States ought to consult the Committee on the question whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, that is to say, items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use.

B. International organizations

14. In accordance with paragraphs 25 and 27 of resolution 687 (1991) international organizations should take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring full compliance with the arms and related sanctions against Iraq,

including providing to the Committee any relevant information that may come to their attention.

15. International organizations having any dealings with, or activities in, Iraq should carefully review their programmes to make sure that they do not facilitate any of the activities prohibited under paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991). Paragraph 13 above shall also apply to international organizations.

C. Intergovernmental cooperation

16. States are encouraged to cooperate with each other bilaterally or within the framework of existing regional or other appropriate intergovernmental organizations or through other appropriate intergovernmental arrangements in the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq. Such cooperation would be particularly useful in matters, among others, of verification of the origin and destination of the items specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in the exchange of documentary evidence relating thereto.

IV. REVIEW OF THE GUIDELINES

17. Taking into account Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991), the general progress towards the control of armaments in the region, information received from States and international organizations and from the Committee, the Security Council may wish to review the guidelines at the same time as its regular reviews of paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 of resolution 687 (1991), as set out in paragraph 28 of the same resolution, that is to say, with the first review being undertaken 120 days after the adoption of that resolution.

18. The Security Council may also wish to consider, in the light of any comments or reports that the Committee may make to it, what further action may be necessary to ensure the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq.

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31 May 1991

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LETTER DATED 30 MAY 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As I indicated in paragraph 13 of my report (S/22559) to the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 19 of its resolution 687 (1991), I attach herewith a note suggesting a percentage figure of the value of Iraq's petroleum exports which should not exceed its contribution to the Fund.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR

Annex

30 May 1991

Note of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 13 of his report of 2 May 1991 (S/22559)

1. On 2 May 1991 I presented to the Council, in compliance with Security Council resolution 687, a report (S/22559) pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). In the same paragraph 19 it was stipulated that Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq should not exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by me. In paragraph 13 of the report, I informed the Council that I will undertake the appropriate consultations as required so that, as soon as possible, I will be in a position to suggest this figure.

2. Authoritative data necessary for the preparation of this communication to the Security Council is not readily available. However, given that Iraq derives almost its entire exports earnings from the export of one single commodity (oil) and that the unit price and export volume of Iraqi oil are monitored by OPEC, it is possible to estimate the size and functioning of its economy in general and of its external trade and payments structure in particular. Data available for this exercise have been taken from various sources including the Government of Iraq, the International Monetary Fund, ESCWA, OPEC, and the United Nations Statistical Office.

3. Paragraph 16 of resolution 687, in defining the extent of Iraq's liability, states that it is "liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign government, national and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait". As paragraph 16 states, this liability is "without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms". Thus, this communication has to limit itself to dealing with the economic and financial possibilities and constraints of Iraq to compensate for the damage defined in paragraph 16.

4. Iraq's oil production quota, as agreed to within OPEC in July 1990, is of 3.14 million barrels per day. With an estimated internal consumption of about 300,000 barrels per day, the Iraqi Government intends to reach its most recent 1989 level of exports of 2.85 million barrels per day in 1993, as communicated by the Permanent Representative to the United Nations to me in his letter of 29 April 1991. If the reference price of $21 per barrel agreed to by OPEC in July 1990 were to be used during 1993, which after adjustment for quality would result in a price of $20.04 for Iraqi crude, total Iraqi export earnings for 1993 can be expected to reach $21 billion, surpassing its 1989 export revenue. Such earnings could conceivably be higher, given that global demand for oil increases by 2 per cent annually, that production in large industrial countries has been declining over the last four years, and that only a few

countries have the reserves and even fewer the production capacity to offset the resulting shortfall. These calculations also assume that all OPEC member countries would return to roughly similar production quotas as those agreed to in July 1990, thus allowing Iraq to reach this level of exports without causing a price collapse.

5. Estimates for foreign exchange expenditures of the Iraqi economy for strictly civilian purposes during the 1980s vary. By taking account of historical relationships of consumption and investment to GDP and their import intensity, and data on net service imports as provided by Iraq, it is estimated that about $8 billion may be required to sustain a level of civilian imports in 1991 consistent with the needs of the Iraqi economy.

6. Iraq's total external debt and obligations have been reported by the Government of Iraq at $42,097 million as of 31 December 1990. However, the exact figure of Iraq's external indebtedness can only be ascertained following discussions between Iraq and its creditors. To estimate debt servicing requirements it is assumed that Iraq reschedules its debts at standard Paris Club terms.

7. With oil exports expected to reach about $21 billion by 1993 imports should absorb about 48 per cent of export earnings and debt servicing approximately 22 per cent. I suggest, therefore, that compensation to be paid by Iraq (as arising from section E of resolution 687) should not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq.

8. The above calculations are based on data and a number of assumptions that have to be kept under review.

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31 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOLOMON ISLANDS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a communiqué concerning the application of the Republic of Korea to become a member of the United Nations:

"The Government of Solomon Islands fully supports the desire of the Republic of Korea as indicated in its memorandum circulated as document S/22455 dated 5 April 1991. The Republic of Korea has over the years demonstrated its effective and significant contribution to the international community in the social and economic fields.

The Government of Solomon Islands firmly believes that the admission of the Republic of Korea would further enhance its role and contributions to the international community and to the universal principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations."

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Francis BUGOTU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-17921 2590b (E)

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31 May 1991

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LETTER DATED 30 MAY 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you the agreement reached on 25 May 1991 between my Executive Delegate's Coordinator in Iraq, Mr. Bernt Bernander, and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Mr. Mohamed Said Al-Sahaf, regarding the deployment in Iraq of a United Nations Guard Contingent. That agreement constitutes an Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 18 April 1991 by my Executive Delegate and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq. For ease of reference, I am also enclosing a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding.

I should be grateful if you could bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR

Enclosure

Memorandum of Understanding signed on 18 April 1991

This memorandum summarizes the results of discussions held in Baghdad between the Government of the Republic of Iraq, in the context of its request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in relation to the suffering of the Iraqi population affected by recent events and Security Council resolution 688 of 5 April 1991, which has not been accepted by the Government of Iraq, and:

(a) From 13 to 18 April 1991, the United Nations Mission led by Mr. Eric Suy, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, and

(b) From 16 to 18 April, the United Nations Inter-Agency Mission led by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the United Nations Secretary-General for the United Nations Humanitarian Programme for Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey Border Areas.

Both Missions have been welcomed by the Government of Iraq.

1. Both sides recognize the importance and urgency of adequate measures, including the provision of humanitarian assistance, to alleviate the suffering of the affected Iraqi civilian population.

2. The Government of the Republic of Iraq welcomes the United Nations efforts to promote the voluntary return home of Iraqi displaced persons and to take humanitarian measures to avert new flows of refugees and displaced persons from Iraq. It pledges its full support to and cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies and programmes in this regard.

3. Both sides agree that the measures to be taken for the benefit of the displaced persons should be based primarily on their personal safety and the provision of humanitarian assistance and relief for their return and normalization of their lives in their places of origin.

4. For this purpose, the Government of the Republic of Iraq agrees to cooperate with the United Nations to have a humanitarian presence in Iraq, wherever such presence may be needed, and to facilitate it through the adoption of all necessary measures. This shall be ensured through the establishment of United Nations sub-offices and Humanitarian Centres (UNHUCs), in agreement and cooperation with the Government of Iraq.

5. Each Centre will be staffed by United Nations civilian personnel which, in addition to the regular staff members of the relevant United Nations agencies, may also include staff co-opted from the non-governmental organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The Red Crescent Society of Iraq shall

be called upon to play a role in the implementation of humanitarian assistance and relief projects.

6. UNHUCs shall facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the needy and would include, inter alia, food aid, medical care, agricultural rehabilitation, shelter and any other humanitarian and relief measures geared to the speedy normalization of life, in conformity with the principles of this memorandum. UNHUCs shall also monitor the overall situation in this regard to advise the Iraqi authorities regarding measures needed to enhance their work.

7. Routes of return, with relay stations along the way as well as logistic back-up capabilities, will be set up urgently in cooperation with the Iraqi authorities to provide to civilians, particularly the women and children as well as the aged and the sick going back to their home areas, the food aid, shelter and basic health care they will need along the way. United Nations staff will accompany such groups, as required.

8. The United Nations shall take urgent measures, in cooperation with the Government of Iraq, for the early stationing of staff as well as the provision of assistance and relief in all designated centres and, as a matter of priority, those close to the Iraqi borders with its neighbouring countries. For this purpose, the United Nations may, in agreement and cooperation with the Government of Iraq, organize air lifts to the areas concerned, as required, as well as transportation by road of humanitarian assistance and relief goods from and through the neighbouring countries under United Nations or other humanitarian auspices. The Government of the Republic of Iraq shall adopt the necessary measures in order to render such aid in a speedy and effective manner.

9. United Nations humanitarian assistance and relief shall be provided simultaneously to the displaced persons, returnees as well as all other populations covered by the relief Programme in order to encourage a speedy normalization of life.

10. The basic framework for United Nations humanitarian action outlined above is intended to facilitate the task of coordination, effective implementation and monitoring of humanitarian assistance and relief operations. Further specifications are contained in the paragraphs which follow.

11. It is agreed that humanitarian assistance is impartial and that all civilians in need, wherever they are located, are entitled to receive it.

12. All Iraqi officials concerned, including the military, will facilitate the safe passage of emergency relief commodities throughout the country.

13. The Government will establish forthwith, together with the United Nations, a relief distribution and monitoring structure to permit access to all civilians covered by the relief Programme, as soon as possible.

14. A Coordinator, at the Assistant Secretary-General level, has been assigned to Baghdad to coordinate, under the Executive Delegate's direction, the implementation of the Humanitarian Relief Programme. He will have permanent access to a high-level government official responsible for emergency activities in the country, to discuss and resolve policy and operational issues that may arise during the implementation of the Programme.

15. The Government of Iraq shall cooperate in granting United Nations field staff access to the parts of the country requiring relief by air or road as needed, to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of the Programme.

16. Intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and other relief agencies will be encouraged to participate in the implementation of the Programme, in close cooperation with the United Nations and under clearly defined terms of association agreed with the Government.

17. The Government of Iraq will help in the prompt establishment of United Nations sub-offices in support of UNHUCs and other programmes in towns. These will be selected so as to facilitate the relief Programme when required, to encourage the voluntary return of, and to provide essential assistance to, internally and externally displaced, as well as to local populations covered by the Programme.

18. A United Nations radio communication system which is an indispensable instrument for the success of relief and rehabilitation activities will be set up. The system will cover communications requirements within Baghdad and other cities covered by the relief Programme and within and outside the country, as appropriate.

19. In order to facilitate implementation of, and resource mobilization for, the relief Programme, the Government will make available cash contributions in local currency to help cover in-country operational costs while pursuing discussions regarding the establishment of a special exchange rate for relief operations carried out by the agencies and organizations participating in the Programme.

20. The implementation of the above-mentioned principles shall be without prejudice to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, security and non-interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Iraq.

21. The above-mentioned principles shall apply for a period ending on 31 December 1991. Two weeks before the expiration of the said period, the principles and their operational modalities shall be reviewed with a view to assessing any further need for their operation.

Done at Baghdad on 3 Shawal 1411 of the Hijri, corresponding to 18 April 1991 A.D.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

(Signed) H.E. Ahmed HUSSEIN
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Government of the
Republic of Iraq

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

(Signed) H.E. Sadruddin Aga KHAN
Executive Delegate of the
United Nations Secretary-General for
the United Nations Humanitarian
Programme for Iraq, Kuwait and the
Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey Border Areas

Annex

1. Following the agreement in principle for the deployment of a United Nations Guards Contingent, discussions were held on 17 and 18 May 1991 to clarify the principal elements associated with the deployment of such guard units, within the framework of the existing Memorandum of Understanding, signed on 18 April 1991 in Baghdad by H.E. Mr. Ahmed Hussein, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq and Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Humanitarian Programme for Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Turkey border areas.

2. As a first step, ten United Nations Guards have been dispatched to Dohuk, on 19 May 1991, in order to establish a United Nations presence at the sub-office and depots in the town. This unit also liaises with the transit camps in the Zakho plain, with a view to enabling the United Nations to assume control thereof. In addition, the unit collaborates with the local civilian administration which is stepping up the rehabilitation of services in the town. The Dohuk/Zakho-based unit of the Contingent will be built to a strength of 50-60 Guards as soon as possible.

3. In addition to transit camps in the Zakho plain, transit centres/zones (which can best be described as strengthened and enlarged humanitarian centres) will be established along communications routes in other areas of Iraq, wherever such presence may be needed, in agreement with the Government of Iraq. United Nations Guards will be assigned as needed to any transit centres, United Nations sub-offices and Humanitarian Centres (UNHUCs) which may be established by the United Nations in Iraq.

4. The number of Guards in the Contingent will be kept under review as further units are dispatched, but will not exceed a total strength of 500. In order to ensure their mobility, special arrangements will be made to import the required number of suitable vehicles. Arrangements will be made to ensure that United Nations-marked helicopter(s) will be allowed to land in Dohuk, Zakho and Mosul, as well as in the other areas, for the movement of United Nations personnel. Necessary arrangements will also be made to provide the Contingent with the required means of communication and the necessary logistical back-up.

5. The number of Guards assigned to the various regions will be decided in consultation with the Government authorities concerned, but would not exceed 150 in any one region. They will move freely, as their duties require, between humanitarian reception points, transit centres and relay stations, as well as sub-offices, using appropriate existing accommodation facilities in the provincial capitals, other towns and villages, or ad hoc field accommodation at transit centres.

6. United Nations Guards will be authorized to carry side-arms (pistols/revolvers), which will be provided by the Iraqi authorities (subject

to the approval of the United Nations with respect to make, model, calibre and munitions). While it is not anticipated that all Guards will be so armed, United Nations guidelines and practices will be followed in this regard.

7. The Iraqi authorities will appoint a Chief Liaison Officer to facilitate the Contingent's operations and a liaison officer at each centre to facilitate their work with the Iraqi authorities. The Iraqi authorities will grant appropriate facilities in Baghdad and elsewhere, including office space, maintenance and repair support, maps, etc.

8. This annex shall be an integral part of the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 18 April 1991. It shall be governed by the terms of that Memorandum; it shall be implemented in cooperation and coordination with the Iraq authorities and expire at the end of the period stated therein (31 December 1991).

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31 May 1991

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LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council is soon to conduct its first review of the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 on imports by Iraq. The resolution requires it to do so in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq. In advance of this review I am writing on instructions from my Government to inform you of our deep concern over Iraq's treatment of two British nationals, Mr. Douglas Brand and Mr. Ian Richter, both held in Iraq.

Mr. Douglas Brand has recently been sentenced to life imprisonment for espionage. He was detained in September while trying to flee Iraq, where he was being held as a hostage under Iraq's illegal human shield policy. The British Government was not informed of his detention nor given consular access to him until April this year. His trial before an Iraqi revolutionary court was wholly inadequate.

Iraq is in clear contravention of Security Council resolutions 664, 674 and 686, which were reaffirmed by Security Council resolution 687, in respect of Mr. Brand. These resolutions call for the release of third country nationals detained after 2 August 1990. Iraq is also in flagrant violation of its obligations under international law in its treatment of Mr. Brand.

Mr. Ian Richter was sentenced in 1987 to life imprisonment on corruption charges which he has always denied. The British Government has protested many times about the inadequate nature of his trial, which did not meet the requirements of Iraq's international obligations, including those under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We believe that he should also be set free.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) D. H. A. HANNAY

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 December 1990 to 31 May 1991)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 December 1990 to 31 May 1991 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 680 (1990) of 14 December 1990, the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 31 May 1991.

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

2. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 680 (1990). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire (see S/14275, para. 7, and footnote 37).

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 31 May 1991:

	Military personnel		
Austria	HQ UNFICYP	12	
	Infantry Battalion	388	
	Military police	10	410
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	The First Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry	538	
	Signal squadron	14	
	Military police	11	575
Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry Battalion, DANCON 55	323	
	Military police	13	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police	3	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police	2	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police	3	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force scout car squadron, C squadron, The Blues and Royals	109	
	The Queen's Own Hussars	349	
	HQ UNFICYP support regiment	45	
	Engineer detachment	8	
	Signal squadron	53	
	Army aviation flight	18	
	Transport squadron	103	
	Medical centre	5	
	Ordnance detachment	11	
	Workshops	30	
	Military police	9	765
Subtotal			2 113
	Civilian police		
Australia		20	
Sweden		18	38
Total UNFICYP			2 151

/...

4. During the period under review UNFICYP suffered three fatalities, two as a result of traffic accidents and one due to natural causes. This brought the total number of fatalities to 161 since the inception of the Force in 1964.

5. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remained under the command of Major General Clive Milner.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

6. UNFICYP maintained close liaison and cooperation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the north of the island, the guidelines established in 1983 (see S/15812, para. 14) continued to be applied. During the period under review, UNFICYP again experienced occasional difficulties. Despite considerable efforts, including discussions with all concerned and indications given to UNFICYP that a response would be forthcoming, it has not been possible for UNFICYP to increase its freedom of movement in the northern part of the island.

7. During the period under review UNFICYP vehicles and personnel were on a number of occasions stopped and sometimes searched when approaching or entering the United Nations buffer zone. These incidents occurred most frequently at the Cypriot Police checkpoint south of Pyla and at the "2.5 mile" checkpoint of the Turkish Cypriot Police Elements. In addition UNFICYP patrols were interfered with by troops of both sides when operating in areas of the buffer zone that are sensitive or not operated in frequently. UNFICYP continued to protest such incidents to the authorities of both sides, reiterating its right to complete access to and freedom of movement in all parts of the buffer zone.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE FORCE

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

8. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

9. UNFICYP keeps the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 150 observation posts, 52 of which are permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols are also employed, especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices are used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

10. The UNFICYP patrol track runs the length of the United Nations buffer zone and is essential to the ability of the Force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise farming in the buffer zone, resupply observation posts and react promptly to incidents. British Engineers maintain these tracks in a workable condition but with considerable effort and difficulty.

11. In my last report I mentioned that UNFICYP had initiated a mine-clearing project that will cover certain parts of the buffer zone where members of UNFICYP as well as civilians are at risk. The final report submitted by the Canadian Engineers has been reviewed and consultations are proceeding on the possible initiation of the project.

12. During the period under review, the number of cease-fire violations decreased, and both sides showed considerable restraint and discipline. There were however two occasions when deliberate shots were fired at the other side. On 14 December 1990 the National Guard fired a warning shot at Turkish Forces personnel who were allegedly inside the buffer zone and on 29 April 1991 the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces fired a shot through the window of a National Guard observation post.

13. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions in Nicosia continued to hold, although during December there was an increase in violations by both sides. UNFICYP is continuing its efforts to extend the agreement to other areas in and adjacent to Nicosia, particularly in areas where the troops of both sides remain in close proximity to each other. It is still experiencing difficulty in achieving this objective.

14. There were six overflights of the United Nations buffer zone by Turkish Forces aircraft and seven by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were four overflights from the north and five from the south by civilian aircraft. Civilian or military aircraft of other countries accounted for a further five overflights.

15. The National Guard programme to construct improvements to its defensive positions along its cease-fire lines continued to be a contentious issue and caused increased tension throughout the period under review. The Turkish Forces made strong representations to UNFICYP demanding that the work be stopped. They considered many of the positions to be new and provocative and to constitute a change in the status quo. Although UNFICYP continues to express reservations about some of the constructions and complains about the National Guard's failure to advise it beforehand of upcoming work, the programme is continuing. The National Guard continues to state that the works are in its area of control and in no way violate the status quo.

16. In my last report I mentioned that, on 19 July 1990, responsibility for controlling entry into Varosha was formally transferred from the Turkish Forces to the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces, who have been deployed in the fenced area of Varosha. In addition UNFICYP's freedom of movement within the area continues to be restricted. I must again recall my report to the Security Council of 29 May 1987, in which I stated that I have reiterated on

several occasions to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities that the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha (see S/18880, para. 28). UNFICYP continues to maintain this position.

17. Near Kokkina and Famagusta, there was a decrease in violations of the seaward extension of the buffer zone known as the maritime security line, established by UNFICYP as a practical measure for security purposes (see S/17657, para. 19). UNFICYP continues to report each crossing of the line to the authorities concerned and warn both sides of the dangers involved and of the need to practise restraint.

18. UNFICYP continued to forbid hunting in the buffer zone. In December 1990, however, serious incidents occurred when Greek Cypriot hunters entered the buffer zone on numerous occasions. When advised by UNFICYP that they were in a restricted area, they threatened UNFICYP with their weapons and on two occasions fired shots over the heads of UNFICYP personnel. UNFICYP's firm action led to their withdrawal. As a result of these incidents, which could have led to serious consequences, UNFICYP is negotiating with the Cyprus Government to devise a plan that would avoid confrontations of this nature in the future.

19. The Government of Cyprus has again complained to the United Nations about the reported destruction of the Cypriot cultural heritage in the northern part of the island. On my instructions, UNFICYP has raised this question with the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

20. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP continued to facilitate economic and other civilian activities in the areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. In particular, UNFICYP continued to encourage farming activities and small commercial activities in the buffer zone.

21. UNFICYP has continued to assist both communities in regard to the supply of electricity and water from one part of the island to the other. It continues to monitor activity on the dam projects on both sides of the buffer zone (see S/21981, para. 25).

22. The 1991 anti-mosquito programme in the buffer zone has started under UNFICYP supervision.

23. The number of Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island is now 576, of whom 572 live in the Karpas peninsula and the remaining 4 in Kyrenia. UNFICYP continued to discharge humanitarian functions for these Greek Cypriots and in this regard delivered to them 416 tons of foodstuff and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross. UNFICYP continued to deliver mail and Red Cross messages across the cease-fire

lines. It also delivered social welfare and pension benefits to Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus. UNFICYP personnel continued to interview, in private, Greek Cypriots who applied for permanent transfer to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Ten such transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated temporary visits by Greek Cypriots to the southern part of the island, including special arrangements for Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north to take part in the parliamentary elections in the south. Over 500 temporary transfers took place during the period under review. At Easter 21 Greek Cypriot schoolchildren were allowed to spend their holidays with their parents in the Karpas region.

24. In January the death of Maria Lazarides, an elderly Greek Cypriot woman resident in the Karpas region, gave rise to numerous allegations of foul play. The Turkish Cypriot authorities cooperated closely with UNFICYP in the resulting investigation. On the basis of a thorough investigation, including a post mortem performed in the presence of an UNFICYP medical officer, UNFICYP concluded that the death of Maria Lazarides was due to natural causes.

25. Following the death of Maria Lazarides, UNFICYP requested that the Turkish Cypriot authorities allow United Nations personnel more access to Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas region. As a result, UNFICYP now carries out resupply runs twice a week; an UNFICYP medical officer makes periodic visits to the Karpas in an effort to have more contact with the Greek Cypriots living there; and UNCIVPOL makes monthly deliveries of social welfare and pension benefits.

26. However, a number of issues concerning the Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas region remain unresolved. The questions of refurbishing the Greek Cypriot elementary schools and the Cape Andreas monastery, the installation of a telephone line from the Karpas region to the south, more frequent temporary transfers and possible visits from families living in the south and abroad are being actively pursued by UNFICYP with the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

27. UNFICYP continued its periodic visits to the Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island. It also helped them to maintain contact with their relatives in the northern part and arranged 13 family reunions involving 74 persons at the Ledra Palace Hotel. These periodic visits by UNFICYP were not restricted in the south with the exception of the Limassol area, where UNFICYP initiated negotiations with the Cypriot Police to lift the remaining restrictions. UNFICYP continued to distribute pension benefits to Turkish Cypriots living in the northern part of the island who were formerly employed by the Government of Cyprus.

28. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island is now 259. UNFICYP continued to assist in arranging frequent contact between Maronites living on the two sides of the cease-fire lines. UNFICYP also delivered to them approximately 136 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government. Contacts between UNFICYP and Maronite

representatives as well as the Maronite Archbishop were maintained during the period under review.

29. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation, to civilian members of both communities. When the need arose, UNFICYP escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the south and regularly delivered medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community. UNFICYP has asked the Turkish Cypriot authorities to permit a helicopter to land in the Karpas peninsula in order to check the landing areas in case of medical emergency.

30. UNFICYP continued its efforts to foster relations in Pyla, a bicommunal village located in the buffer zone. Intercommunal meetings between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars of Pyla resumed in January. However, the police control-point operated by the Government of Cyprus on the Larnaca-Pyla road outside the buffer zone continued to disrupt the economic life of the village severely.

31. In April, work began on the construction of a minaret on the mosque in Pyla. Strong protests were received from the Cyprus Government. This issue generated considerable controversy with allegations that the minaret was intended for military purposes and that its construction would damage relations between the two communities in the village. After a number of meetings between the two mukhtars of Pyla, it became clear that there was no hostility to the idea from the villagers of both communities. UNFICYP negotiated a reduction in the height of the minaret and the construction is proceeding without incident.

32. Another problem that arose in Pyla during the reporting period related to a project initiated by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, without UNFICYP's consent, to install telephones in the homes of the Turkish Cypriot villagers, which would enable them to communicate with the northern part of the island. This action was protested by the Cyprus Government, which insisted that the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority is the only legal telephone company in Cyprus and that it must make any telephone installations in Pyla. The situation was further exacerbated by military exercises conducted by the National Guard in the proximity of Pyla. UNFICYP has requested the Turkish Cypriot authorities not to proceed with their project and is in active contact with both sides in an attempt to resolve this matter.

33. The United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) maintained close cooperation and liaison with the Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot Police on matters with intercommunal aspects. In conjunction with UNFICYP line units, they contributed to the maintenance of law and order and assisted in investigations, in the control of civilians in the buffer zone and in humanitarian activities.

34. UNFICYP cooperated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as coordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus. UNHCR supported

bicommunal projects such as sewage, medical care and rehabilitation of the handicapped, emergency medical care and environmental matters. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued projects with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

35. During the period under review the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held 4 sessions (48th-51st), consisting of 21 meetings of which 15 were attended by the 3 members of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and their assistants and 6 were attended by the 3 members. The Committee continued its discussions on reports by both sides and its investigations in the field on the cases that have been submitted to it so far. During the period a number of new cases were submitted to the Committee. At the conclusion of its 51st session on 31 May, the Committee issued a communiqué appealing to all concerned "to pursue systematically and with greater efforts their indispensable assistance to its activities. The most important aspect of the mandate is the interviewing of witnesses and here, in particular, the Committee needs the full support of all."

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

36. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 June 1991, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and assuming continuation of its existing strength and responsibilities, is estimated at $15.4 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense

(In thousands of United States dollars)

I.	Operational costs incurred by the United Nations	
	Movement of contingents	290
	Operational expenses	1 720
	Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	746
	Rations	965
	Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	3 229
	Miscellaneous and contingencies	250
	Total I	7 200

II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents

Pay, allowances and transport	7 400
Contingent-owned equipment	700
Death and disability	100
Total II	8 200
Grand total (I and II)	15 400

37. The estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

38. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force which is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, Member States have contributed only $3.2 million against anticipated expenditures of some $15.4 million for the mandate period that is about to end. As these contributions have never been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force, the reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been met only up to December 1980. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be approximately $178.7 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

39. In my statement of 27 March 1991, I reported to the Security Council on my mission of good offices. On 28 March 1991, the President of the Security Council issued a statement on behalf of its members in which the members of the Council, inter alia, welcomed my intention to submit a further report by early July 1991 on my effort to arrive at an agreed outline of an overall settlement. The members of the Council stated that they would decide, in the light of the situation at that time, on any further measures for proceeding that may be necessary.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

40. During the past six months, UNFICYP continued to perform its important functions in an exemplary manner, often under difficult circumstances.

41. In the light of the prevailing circumstances, I have no doubt that the continued presence of the Force in the island remains indispensable to achieve

the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend to the Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

42. In making this recommendation, I must again stress that UNFICYP is facing a chronic and ever-deepening financial crisis, which imposes a most unfair burden on the troop-contributing countries. I fully share their Governments' concern at this situation. As I have suggested on a number of occasions, the best way to finance UNFICYP on a more equitable basis would be for the United Nations share of the costs of the Force to be financed from assessed contributions. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 682 (1990) of 21 December 1990, the Secretariat has been cooperating actively with the Group of Friends of the President of the Security Council in the preparatory work it has undertaken to facilitate the Council's consideration of this issue.

43. I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have continued to give this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Governments that have contributed towards the financing of the Force.

44. In concluding, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camilión, to the Force Commander, Major General Clive Milner, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 December 1990-31 May 1991)

Addendum

Map. Deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, May 1991


قبرص • 塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • CHIPRE
حدود مقاطعة
区界
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округов
Limite de distrito
مطار ، مهبط
机场, 简易机场
Airfield, airstrip
Aéroport, terrain d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлётно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNCIVPOL
HQ BRITCON
HQ CANCON
Force Scout Car Sqn (-)
UN HP Coy (-)
UNFICYP Support Regt
Engineer Det
Signal Sqn
Army Air Corps Flight
Transport Sqn
Ordnance Det
Reme Workshop
Medical Centre
Canadian Logistic Coy
HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
HQ Coy (-)
One Coy
One Engr Tp
HQ SECTOR 1 (DANCON)
HQ & SP Coy
One Engr Sect
One Coy
Two Recce Sects
One Ferret Tp
MP Det
One Coy
SECTOR 2
One Pl
One Coy (-)
SECTOR 1
UNCIVPOL Stn
SECTOR 3
One Coy
SECTOR 4
HQ SECTOR 4 (AUSCON)
HQ Coy
MP Det
One Pl
Ferret Tp
Coy (-)
MP Det
UNCIVPOL Stn
One Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MP Det
One Pl
One Coy (-)
Ferret Tp
HQ SECTOR 3 (CANCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
Recce Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
KYRENIA
NICOSIA
FAMAGUSTA
LARNACA
LIMASSOL
PAPHOS
انتشار قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانةالسلم في ايار/مايو ١٩٩١
一九九一年五月联塞部队的部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF MAY 1991
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE MAI 1991
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА МАЙ 1991
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN MAYO DE 1991
خطوط وقف إطلاق النار للقوات التركية
土耳其部队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Lineas de cesacion del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
خطوط وقف إطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي
塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Lineas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre
حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص
联塞部队行动分界线
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza
MAP NO. 2930 REV. 29 UNITED NATIONS
MAY 1991

UNITED
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 December 1990-31 May 1991)

Addendum

In my report of 31 May 1991 (S/22665, para. 41), I recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months, and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on the matter. I wish to inform the Council that the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have indicated their concurrence with the proposed extension. The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with and supports the position of the Turkish Cypriot side, which is that the text of the draft resolution contained in document S/22700 is unacceptable as a basis for extending the stationing of UNFICYP, but that its stand will be expounded at the meeting of the Security Council.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Item 35 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 3 June 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, and pursuant to our previous letters concerning repeated Israeli attacks against Lebanon, I inform you that Israeli military aircraft today carried out a further raid on the town of Myey-o-Myeh, near Sidon. As a result, three people were killed, seven others injured and extensive damage was done to buildings and property.

In affirming that it condemns and deplores this attack, which constitutes a blatant act of defiance against international laws and conventions, the Lebanese Government once again calls upon the States members of the Security Council - and particularly the five permanent members - to take serious action to end Israel's disdain for the sovereignty of Lebanon and the safety of its citizens and those residing in its territory, as well as serious action to implement Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which provides for Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the extension of the Lebanese State's sovereignty throughout its territory.

I should be grateful if the present letter were distributed as an official document of the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under item 35 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Permanent Representative

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* A/46/50.

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